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The State and Communism

(1) Identifying the State

A Scientific approach to constructing understanding approaches the world of facts with intent and understands this intent. The creation of knowledge can happen without intent, with intent, and by intending intent. Without intent, one just knows by chance. With the intentional creation of knowledge, a knower makes an attempt to understand. At its highest form, the intentional process behind forming knowledge can become controlled and distinguished between Scientific and unscientific formations of knowledge.

For approaching the state, we must keep in mind how we make this identification and draw conclusions from it. If we say a toaster is what is made with plastic, then we could very easily attempt to toast bread with a television remote which is made with plastic. And so, the state is a building, a bureaucrat, a weapon, a stack of papers, a badge, a door, a custodian, etc. We are faced with a number of properties, and we must select that which distinguishes the state. Moreover, we have the state of Germany, of China, of Cuba, the United States, etc. Then when we seek to identify the state, we are presented with numerous properties and numerous states, and we must still make our identification. When we make an identification, it must be exclusive to what we mean to distinguish out from what is not what we mean to identify. Being made with plastic is a quality which is common to the toaster, a remote, a calculator, etc. It is not exclusive or distinguishing and cannot be said a correct identification.

What is unique about a state to a toaster, is that a toaster won’t try to tell you how to live your life. If a toaster could speak, it could try to give you a command. You can simply unplug it. Its bark would be bigger than its bite. Provided you don’t stick a metal fork around inside of it, there would be no consequence to refusing to follow the toaster’s commands. On the other hand, the decrees made by a state have consequences. Demands, orders, decrees, rules, have a tendency to mean less without consequence. What is exclusively qualifying to an authoritative demand is the capacity of force behind it. Take away the force and a command loses a compelling character. One may follow a command without the capacity of force behind it, but one with force behind it will win out every time; provided the force is a force to be reckoned with.

Here we have distinguished authoritative enforcement. The state which is also a building, a badge, etc. additionally and exclusively writes and enforces law and then authoritatively writes and enforces rules. Yet this feature of authoritative enforcement is found in plenty of social places. And then seems to lack an exclusive character. If we mean to identify the state as an authoritative organization making commands, we could confuse it for another social form of authority. Marxism has distinguished out a kind of authoritative organization, apparently, exclusive to the state. Lenin’s close reading of Marx and Engels on the state culminates in his *State and Revolution* as an organized and referenced work on Marxism’s concept of the state. Here we have Lenin:

Engels elucidates the concept of the “power” which is called the state, a power which arose from society but places itself
above it and alienates itself more and more from it. What does this power mainly consist of? It consists of special bodies of armed men having prisons, etc., at their command... We are justified in speaking of special bodies of armed men, because the public power which is an attribute of every state “does not directly coincide” with the armed population, with its “self-acting armed organization”.

The state is made of “special bodies of armed men”. “Special” because they are “above” society, meaning alienated from it. Marxism begins to understand the state as an authoritative organization, it identifies the particularity of the state as an authoritative body, as a “special body”. We are told this “special body” is distinct from a “self-acting armed organization”. What is it then that distinguishes the “special” and “above” armed organization from the “self-acting” armed organization that is “below” the “special” one?

(2) Scientific Universality

We know so far that the state must have an identifying element to it, when this element is present in social activity, we would hope we can identify the state out of other social activity. The element which can distinguish itself exclusively has a greater authenticity over a non-exclusive non-identifying element. The toaster and all that is made with plastic has the common element of being made with plastic. Yet the toaster as having oven slots with heated coils for cooking would truly grasp what a toaster is meant to identify. Out of all the items in a retail store, those which would have this common element would be a toaster. This, more authentic, accurate, identification distinguishes toasters from other items and unites all toasters by this common element. There are red toasters and black toasters. Both of which are toasters. There are states of one nationality and states of another. States with one set of laws and states with another.

If we then identify the state in its exclusivity and distinction, and this identifying element is a common element among many states, we find a general, common, genus, abstract universality. The identification of commonality is an interesting trick to confused theorists. There are many things which have redness, yet redness itself seemingly cannot exist independent of being present on something with redness. There may be a red or black toaster, both red and black toasters are toasters, and then toasters in common as a toaster as such. Here we understand three things. The red toaster, the black toaster, and then the elements which are common and exclusively qualifying as toaster. We have the red toaster, the black toaster, and the category ‘toaster’. Yet only two of the three can toast bread. Both toasters exist tangibly, while the understanding of a toaster is a mental act. So then is the same case with the state, where there is the state of Rome, the state of China, both of which are states, both are expressions of a third thing, a state. We can find a Libcom article, meaning to critique Lenin’s State and Revolution which claims this universal identification of the state is “a transhistorical abstraction, an a priori construction” an “empiricist abstraction” resulting in a “metaphysical object called a state”.

Common to left-communism is bad dialectics, the categories are seemingly present, yet always in a vague and confused mess. The category of general, universality,
abstract universality, seemingly fails to exist in reality; abstract universality is reduced to confused thinking. What is abstract universal is only made by thought, yet thought from the thinking mind exist within reality. Identifying common features of an object is a mental activity, but that does not make it unreal, nor does it make unreal what the mind identifies in commonality. Being able to make abstraction is a part of reality and a powerful tool used to shape the world. Redness cannot be found on its own in any other form than thought, but thought is very real. Over-enthusiastic left-communism wants to follow Marx’s materialism, they want to grasp materialist reality, yet they put thinking outside of materialist reality, and then reject the reality of thought. This would-be-Marx’s-materialism should have, although, noticed Marx making “transhistorical abstractions” many times, here even boldly when he says, in his 1859 Critique:

\[ Production \text{ in general is an abstraction, but a sensible abstraction in so far as it actually emphasizes and defines the common aspects and thus avoids repetition [original italics]. } \]

Marx also speaks of the ‘social metabolism’ of human production as a universal abstraction in \textit{Capital}. But again, from Marx’s \textit{Critique}:

\[ \text{To recapitulate: there are categories which are common to all stages of production and are established by reasoning as general categories; the so-called general conditions of all and any production, however, are nothing but abstract concepts which do not define any of the actual historical stages of production [original italics].} \]

What Marx is saying, often all the time, is that treating the general, common, abstract universal features of production as the particular features of production of bourgeois society is the dogma of bourgeois political economy.

When Marxism says that the state is intrinsically bourgeois, it secretly says that it is only intrinsically bourgeois before anti-bourgeois measures in the proletariat dictatorship. Here we have three things, the state of the proletariat dictatorship, the non-proletariat dictatorship, and what is common to them both, the state, abstract universality. Creating and enforcing law is common to both, then we are told from Marxism, even if unintentionally, that creating and enforcing law can have multiple applications. When law serves the interests of free-enterprise it is law, when it challenges the interests of free enterprise, either partially or absolutely, it is law.

Law and the state, the creating and enforcing of law, the creating and enforcing of rules, when under the sway of a particular social force, expresses that force in law. The general and abstract state is manifested in its particular concrete form determined by historically developed and developing social forces. A social faction expressed in law has its wants expressed in authority. The represented wants attempt to suppress its unwanted social activity, and then preserve wanted social activity. Wants to regulate speed limit, the practices of parenting, a comfortable level of noise, etc. Law is the attempt to apply conflict resolution between social groups. The state, then, reflects this factional character. If law is enforced, it represents one section of the population
against another. Law then mediates antagonism of social parties where the parties face-off in legal representation.

It is the factional character of the state which can greatly bring about a reification of social powers. It seems law and the state are acting on their own, not driven by a social influence. Here exists a failure to discover what’s pulling strings. It should not be surprising, that, in advanced welfare states, the majority, of moaning about an absolutized state is done by positions favorable to bourgeois free-enterprise. They oppose “big government”. The finest of bourgeois propaganda teaches the public to fear law, and then attempts to teach the public to fear what they fear, the public’s best interest used against them in law.

The social relations determining the state is the relation between two antagonistic parties. Yet this relationship is itself a product of the two parties and then we have not only the two parties but also the political body which mediates. The political body is no less a party standing in a relation to the other social forces. The political body, separated from engaging in producing subsistence and means of production, lives from contributions made to it by the public, in the so called only other certainty in life, taxes. A political body can approach outside social groups, for service or for plunder. In exchange for contributions the political body can offer representation, and then offers sway over the creation and enforcement of law. However, the state can also make its demands and offer no representation in return. And who would give up a life of adventurous plunder and instead turn around and offer representation? The self-drive of any individual to join a political body to offer representation in the recruit most likely will believe in what it represents. Here then it should not be surprising that historical states bind themselves to religious representation. It has been common to think of religious leaders of having manipulated a political body into following them with the help of superstition. And perhaps it must have to had start that way in one way or another, although it is quite likely that the members of the political body seek to represent what they believe in; and then have propped up religious leaders conforming to their beliefs, and betraying them when they diverge.

The exclusive character of a political body is in its writing and enforcing laws. A division of labor is distinguishable between these two actions. The senator and the enforcement. The intrinsic character of authoritative enforcement itself. Each of these two exclusive components of the body of authoritative enforcement, the political body, have their own intrinsic features. Without enforcement, legal decrees mean little, and without decrees, enforcement has nothing to enforce. Yet there is a bigger end of the stick here. The enforcement can have its own ideas too. The senator and the enforcer are bound, but not by unbreakable strength. Law needs enforcement, yet the creation of law is not bound to any omnipotent power of any one senator. The senate gives directions to enforcement, and thus seems to have the more authoritative position. Yet this is only in one sense. The senator hands directions to the enforcer which the enforcer follows by law. The senate as the director of enforcement is an authority backed by law, but then by law itself. The senator hands the enforcer an order, and the enforcer follows, by law, and then by enforcement, and then by enforcement trusted to enforce itself. The enforcer agrees to follow the senator, and has agreed in law, and therefore has agreed to enforce upon themself that they will enforce for the senator. Law is enforced by law. Here our enforcer figures it out, if they self-relinquish the responsibility to follow the senator then they can freely disobey the senator. Here
the enforcer has only one thing holding them back, the opinion of other enforcement, as they have taken themselves, either successfully or unsuccessfullly, as the new senator.

(3) The Expressions of Universality

These social groups in antagonism vary immensely. Marx and Engels tell us of these legal wants correlating to the interests of social arrangements and the history of this class struggle. Yet as the relations of production have conflict so do other relations. Marxism’s one-note musical can only see, and at worse, only understand social antagonism as antagonism between the classes of production, of antagonistic economic interests alone. It can seemingly think of no other reason why there may be social conflict apart from economic conflict and disorganization. To Marxism, we nearly should expect all social conflict to be gone completely after the end of economic conflict. This is also behind the theory of the state “withering away”.

Lenin elaborates on the “withering away” most notably. The process stated is that when government is changed to proletariat dictatorship the state will begin to “wither away”, without the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat the state will continue to “wither away”. The state will completely “wither away” once goods are in abundance and the antithesis between mental and physical labor disappears; once this has happened: “There will then be no need for society, in distributing the products, to regulate the quantity to be received by each; each will take freely “according to his needs”.” Then once economic antagonisms completely vanish the state will vanish, as the prophecy has foretold. Yet Lenin adds that he can notice that there is more social conflict than economic conflict, yet has quite an inventive twist of words to make it fit into the Marxist understanding of the state:

Lastly, only communism makes the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is nobody to be suppressed-- “nobody” in the sense of a class, of a systematic struggle against a definite section of the population.

So, with Lenin’s interpretation, when Marxism says that “nobody” is in antagonism other than economic antagonisms, to be aided by legal regulation, it means “nobody” as the opposite of the actual meaning of “nobody”. So “nobody” is in any conflict outside of economic conflict, but by “nobody” we only mean those already outside of economic conflict. See, Lenin shows us how Marxism was right all along...

Yet even as Lenin cracks open the one-sidedness of the Marxist understanding of conflict what comes from it must be incorporated into a new society. If there are more social antagonisms, this is a problem which needs to be addressed, we have Lenin’s solution immediately following his last quote:

We are not utopians, and do not in the least deny the possibility and inevitability of excesses on the part of individual persons, or the need to stop such excesses. In the first place, however, no special machine, no special apparatus of suppression, is needed for this: this will be done by the armed people themselves, as simply and as
readily as any crowd of civilized people, even in modern society, interferes to put a stop to a scuffle or to prevent a woman from being assaulted. And, secondly, we know that the fundamental social cause of excesses, which consist in the violation of the rules of social intercourse, is the exploitation of the people, their want and their poverty. With the removal of this chief cause, excesses will inevitably begin to "wither away". We do not know how quickly and in what succession, but we do know they will wither away. With their withering away the state will also wither away [original italics].

Even as Lenin has it that the state arises from conflict and then admits that conflict exists beyond economic conflict alone, he also claims that the state will must "wither away" with just ending the economic conflict alone. After all levels of social conflict fall with economic organization those iron-laws of predictability have foretold that the "armed people" will take on what remains of social conflict instead of the "special body". Yet why again is this "special body" all-so "special"?

(4) The Bourgeois State

A public's democratic republic opens the right of political representation to all social groups with minor exceptions. The sway which directs the creation of law is a result of the outcome of its contending influences. When an influence wins over another, it can succeed in enforcing its desired state of relations. The victorious faction then uses authoritative suppression over its unwanted state. A faction which opposes the victorious faction would lose their enforceable wants, yet if the democratic republic is to remain in-tact, then the losing side still retains the right of representation. It had its wants fail in the political arena, yet can keep trying to implement them. This is contrastable to state of dictatorship, which not only wins in enforced law, yet also denies any political contest from selected ideas.

The epoch of the bourgeoisie has its conflicts rooted in the social relations which define it. The conflicting interests of free-markets, free-enterprise, intensified by economic disorganization, form major battlegrounds of political conflict. It is here where the major struggle over bourgeois interests takes place, and where these bourgeois interests exercise their rights of representation. To Marxism, these bourgeois rights always win as a result of a supposed intrinsic bourgeois nature of law, or from Marxism unintentionally, the statement is perhaps only a pessimistic one. This drives Marxism to go as far as declaring the state of bourgeois economy as the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and all circumstances. And what could this mean? Here bourgeois interests are at victory over their contenders. Yet is it because it has won political sway or that it has denied the rights of opposition? This is a pretty big distinction, if the answer is that both are bourgeois dictatorships then our category is not all that helpful. It is far from insignificant if anti-free-enterprise is or is not given the right of representation in a state. To be able to tell the difference is quite helpful to any comrade in their particular nationality.

The state of the bourgeois mode of production will be a state inevitably split between its defining network of conflict. To what degree law represents various forces in the
conflicts of this society varies and continuously goes through changes. Here arises the possibility of bourgeois forces to gain influence, and gain influence both popularly as well as autocratically. As Marx has pointed out and Marxism has followed, these bourgeois interests have their particular powers for gaining representation. The accumulation of wealth in a society based on free-exchange gives the ability to control others through providing in exchange. How much is offered and how desperate another party is, will determine the limits what one can get another to do and within the limits of enforceable law. This gives a set of possibilities to money-bags in social influence as peculiar powers to these interests as they exist in political contests. This is what draws Marx and Engels to state: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force”.

A state could deny the challenging of bourgeois interests in two ways. It could deny them relatively or absolutely. It can be outlawed to ask for better employee treatment, and it can be outlawed to challenge private and free-enterprise. On the other hand, a state of bourgeois society can allow the full right to challenge bourgeois interests politically in a democratic republic. Each of the three options would be labeled dictatorships of the bourgeoisie by Marxism. When Marxism makes its confessions, no matter how democratic a republic is, it is still a bourgeois dictatorship, not because of the direct sway of the bourgeoisie, nor bringing in an intrinsic bourgeois character to law, but of indirect sway.

The indirect sway of bourgeois forces, apart from direct sway, sways the hearts and minds of the public which appoints its state body. The influence over owning means of production gives them a social influence. The medium which this victory is obtained is through the will of the public. And this is a domain Marxism claims to have mastered. Apparently equipped with the goals of the public and the skills of leadership, Marxism believes itself to be connectable to the public. Yet if it finds itself against an indirect sway then it finds itself against the public.

The particularity of the state of bourgeoise society is nothing set in stone. It is no omnipotent force imposing upon the relations of bourgeois society. The question is not how the state affects bourgeois society but how bourgeois society affects the state. The creation and enforcement of law takes the form of concrete manifestation and draws and enforces its powers from and to the social relations of its given setting. Law will and must be contended between its forces, where the removal of the right of oppositional representation is a possibility for multiple sides of conflict. And if laws set in place could never change, then present society would be quite an interesting place. A given state of social conflict expressed in law will exist as long as its determinants are in place.

(5) The State and Transition

The creation of a new society involves a creation process and a finished product. Without wishing the new into existence, the re-organization of an economy must be an enforced process. Marx and Engels, along with Lenin, the revolutionary path to political power is said to be the only way. We are told in the *Manifesto*, communism can be obtained “only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions”. Lenin
in *State and Revolution* tells us: “The supersession of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution.”

To Marxism, a democratic republic in a bourgeois economy cannot become a tool to communism due to the omnipotent direct bourgeois sway, omnipotent indirect bourgeois sway, the intrinsic bourgeois rule of law, or any combination of the three. We have shown here how law is not wedded to any specific class. And that Marxism too must unintentionally admit it following its convictions. Then if law has no intrinsic character to oppose communism, what remains as opposition is direct or indirect bourgeois sway. And the question for us is be the bourgeois sway omnipotent or not?

It is interesting to know that Marx and Engels can have cracks in their revolutionary absolutism. In an 1880 letter, Marx explains that German bourgeois sway over law removed their rights of representation: “In Germany the working class were fully aware from the beginning of their movement that you cannot get rid of a military despotism but by a Revolution.” As opposed to Germany, in England, Marx says, in this same letter:

> If you say that you do not share the views of my party for England I can only reply that that party considers an English revolution not *necessary*, but – according to historic precedents – *possible*. If the unavoidable evolution turn into a revolution, it would not only be the fault of the ruling classes, but also of the working class. ... it is only because the English working class know not how to wield their power and use their liberties, both of which they possess legally [original italics].

Here Marx claims the citizens of England have legal rights of representation which they can exercise. Here also we have a July 18, 1871 *Interview with Karl Marx Head of L'Internationale*:

> In England, for instance, the way to show political power lies open to the working class. Insurrection would be madness where peaceful agitation would more swiftly and surely do the work. In France, a hundred laws of repression and a mortal antagonism between classes seem to necessitate the violent solution of social war. The choices of that solution is the affair of the working classes of that country. The International does not presume to dictate in the matter and hardly to advise. But to every movement it accords its sympathy and its aid within the limits assigned by its own laws.

It would seem like this is some rather dynamic thinking, as opposed to that sale old Lenin-endorsed one-sidedness. Engels also had some support for winning elections. In a June 1893 interview with Engels by the Daily Chronicle. The interviewer asks, regarding the elections in Germany: *“Then you expect soon to see, what everybody is curious to see -- a Socialist Government in power?”* and Engels replies: “Why not? If the growth of our Party continues at its normal rate we shall have a majority between the
years 1900 and 1910. And when we do, you may be assured we shall neither be short of ideas nor men to carry them out.”

No doubt will plenty of Marx and Engels quotes say the opposite of above. Yet the truth is that these differences stand in contradiction to one another. The quotes of Marx’s on evolution advocate a multi-sided strategy fit to various circumstances. In a 1872 speech titled *La Liberté Speech*, we get Marx, with similar statements: “…we have not asserted that the ways to achieve that goal are everywhere the same.”

(6) The State and Communism

The true intrinsic character of law, as distinct from Marxism’s illusion of an intrinsic bourgeois rule of law, has consequences not only for present society but also for the next one. The fall of economic conflict is but one fall in the determination of law. To say that no other social conflict would exist without economic conflict must be an over-statement. Other social conflict does exist, but to Marxism it apparently does not determine law, and hence it is only when the economic conflict disappears does the state along with it; leaving behind the other social conflict to be handled not by a state, but instead, by “the armed people themselves”.

The distant Marxist utopia of the “higher stage” of communism with the end of economic conflict by having all production and consumption on a strict moneyless volunteer basis with an abundance of resources is already a flimsy foundation in which to place any theory on, including the “withering away” of the state. This is Marxism’s way of arguing against its anarchist comrade. The migration of recruits in and out of Marxism and “Anarchism” both express the evils of the rule of law in two different ways. One wants to use it and throw it away, or rather have it “wither away”, the other not to use it at all.

We can recall that Lenin’s formulation had it that the state is a “special body” as opposed to a “self-acting armed organization”, by “the armed people themselves”. This is then a significant distinction as the qualifications which exclusively identify one over the other will determine whether or not a state exists. If a medical treatment wanted to identify the presence of a harmful virus they could have some way of identifying it, and to use this identification method to see if it will go away with treatment. If the state is to “wither away”, the exclusively qualifying properties of authority in law must also go away.

The creation of an authoritative demand uses powers given to humankind as a birthright. Any individual can express this power, or a group of individuals can unite and express this power. The state however, must be determined out of any other kind of expression of authority. A mafia approaches a business and demands pay for exchange for protection. And a business must pay taxes or it is shut down. The government is a mafia! It would seem that there is no exclusive distinction in authoritative demands to a state. Here Marxism has the state as a “special body” and offers us a needed exclusive character, yet one that will fail us.

The “special body” is distinct from the rest of society by being “above” the rest of society. But what does it mean to be “above” society? Here it must not mean that it lives above the clouds, perhaps on Mount Olympus, and cries its wants down to the
masses. It must mean that the “special body” is separate and “above” because the public has no means of influencing it. It writes its laws and enforces them on the masses, which can do nothing about it. Then communism would turn this alienated authority to the public when it places it in their hands. When the public have no influence over law, and it is “above” them, the authority would then be identified as a state, when it is not “above” society, it then must not be a state, as being “special” would be the exclusive character of the state. An interesting conclusion arises from this. If what qualifies a state is out of the reach of the public, then to put it in the hands of the public would not be defined as a state.

Lenin has told us that there are other conflicts besides economic conflicts, and we should believe him. As seen in crystal balls, when the state “withers away” from the end of economic conflict, then, coming from Lenin, noticing the other social conflict, and working within the limits of blinders, states that “no special machine, no special apparatus of suppression” will be needed to be involved with the other social conflict. It will be handled by “the armed people themselves”. This can mean one of two things. Either 1) that the “special” body is given its powers to the public in a new state “self-acting armed organization”; or 2) that enforcement in other social conflict be handled by vigilantes.

Wanting to do away with the evil rule of law, vigilanteism is offered as an alternative. Perhaps this is what “self-acting” is taken to mean? Instead of forgetting where ideas come from, notions of solutions to conflicts do not fall from the sky. What is to be enforced and how it is to be enforced left to vigilantes is subjective and unaccountable to the public. Each vigilante force will have to subjectively make a decision which is authoritatively binding on others. It is very easy to see the likelihood of disagreement among vigilantes themselves. May we suggest the anti-law proposed vigilantes be organized and held accountable to the public? Or are we again just being statists?

Vigilanteism, rule by vigilantes, seeks to tear down the “above” “special body” and turn power to “the armed people themselves”. Yet what would make a state “above” society is being out of reach of the public, which gives exclusive sway to a minority, and then a dictatorship. To do away with the state of dictatorship is to give the power to create and enforce law to the public through democracy. The public’s democratic republic imposes its will on the public, but is driven by the public themselves, it is not an alien force “above” them. If it unreasonably excludes them, denies them representation, then it is no democratic republic as it is meant here. The vigilante has this in common with a dictator, they are both members of the public. They use authoritative enforcement. And perhaps most importantly, are not accountable to the public. The attempt to tear down the “special” body and to give it to “the armed people themselves” by giving, or rather allowing, enforceable power to vigilantes, is only to turn enforcement from one unaccountable force “above” society to another one. The dictator imposes as they wish, and so does the vigilante, traveling the night looking for what they classify as a crime, and then attempting to handle it in whatever way they see fit. If vigilantes are taken as enforcement, then authoritative enforcement is still “special”, yet just not an organized body. Both organized dictatorship and disorganized vigilanteism is unaccountable to the public.

Marxism’s qualification of the state’s exclusive character as “special” was no attempt to distinguish the state out of any other authoritative enforcement. Yet in effect it was
a distinction which would. As the “special” identification of the state falls when the power of law falls into the hands of the public, society, to this organization of categories, would be stateless. The identification of “special” no longer exists, and thus nothing to distinguish a state out of any other authoritative enforcement. Yet a democratic republic is a state by anybody’s meaning to identify a state. And must be to be a bourgeois dictatorship to Marxism. If the state in a democratic republic is a state, then the qualification to authoritative enforcement as a state cannot be authoritative enforcement that is “special”.

Authoritative enforcement, consisting in performing actions inherent to any individual, is then a common social phenomenon. Anyone can try to make another person follow their commands. This authoritative enforcement gives life to a state, we know this. Without this element backing up demands from the state, their meaning is lost. Whether or not rules are backed by consequences is a significant factor in determining if anyone would follow any given rule. What is common to many states, and many laws, is many things. But what is exclusively qualifying about them is they are all expressions of authoritative enforcement of rule. Yet if this authoritative enforcement is present outside a state then the element of authoritative enforcement is wrongly classified as a state. A fight, parent, mafia, etc. all express authority. What is exclusively qualifying to the state is authoritative enforcement, yet only a specific kind. Law and the state has a “official” character to it. It is interesting to note the difference between Marx’s treatment of the transition from his General Commodity to his Money Commodity. The General Commodity is used to exchange for other commodities and so is the Money Commodity. The difference between the two categories for Marx is a social recognition, a “official” status: “The particular commodity, with whose bodily form the equivalent form is thus socially identified, now becomes the money commodity, or serves as money. It becomes the special social function of that commodity, and consequently its social monopoly, to play within the world of commodities the part of the universal equivalent.” The authoritative enforcement of the state generally is successful across its nation of being the recognized “official” social body of rule; which is of course built out of challenge from its challengeable character.

The state, as law, as organized authority, as “official” recognized authority, as the capacity to use force by its individual recruits for better or for worse presents us with an exclusive abstract universality. This abstract quality must have concrete appearance. The concrete form is but a form of appearance of this abstract universality, determined by the relations of its concrete existence within the limits of its intrinsic character.

Just as redness itself doesn’t exist, legal authoritative enforcement itself does not exist from any given moment it appears in. Thoughtlessness approaches the state in any given manifested form and uses this as the only platform to draw conclusions from. Something universal, dynamic, capable of taking many forms, presents one side of itself to thoughtlessness and thoughtlessness can only grasp this one particular form. Like a child thinking teachers live at school, because that is where they interact with them; or thinking that historical events existed in black-and-white like photographs of them are. Here the state has a character granted to it by its historically developed determinations, and to one-sidedness the state is intrinsically bound to do the one and only thing it is doing in example for them. An interesting flaw coming from
Marxism which has taken to explain the universality of the human relations of production and their particular historical forms.

One-sidedness does not see that any application of law is but one particular application of law, which is but one of many alternative applications of law possible. Then when one-sidedness suffers from law, and fails to exercise fair influence over it, it curses the whole official body of social authoritative enforcement itself. But what exists instead of brave righteousness against suppression and the use of force is instead infantile confusion. A state with a character oppositional to communism is not the intrinsic feature of law. If a state exists in opposition to communism it is either by indirect or direct sway, and either denies representation relatively or absolutely, but is not in itself intrinsically oppositional.

It is also the case from our free-enterprise loving friends in the era of welfare states and regulations to answer the calls of the interests of free-enterprise against its mighty opponent in law. They call to oppose the rule of law for the sake of liberty. Humankind has, to a degree, yet only for now, conquered the sphere of nature. It is no longer subjected to the tragedies that our ancestors once faced from its outside environment. Still, life, liberty, and happiness, can not only be violated by a state but also by individual infringement. And are we to demand nothing? If force can be used to subdue, then it can only be answered in force. Then force is not just a weapon inseparable to the violators of justice, but also a force against them; and then force itself is no violation of justice. Within authority, justice is either preserved or crushed.

It is in the public’s best interest to wield a democratic republic, and to have authoritative enforcement against excesses individuals would take against them, rather than succumb to the liberties of vigilantes. And as it is in the public’s best interest to peruse economic organization, and then become the enforced will of the public; the defense of law is a defense for a self-conscious and self-determining public, not against it.